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EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW




N this Survey, we highlight some of the most notable 2004 employ-
ment law-related cases and legislation. Most notably, the survey year
saw practitioners and courts alike assessing the fallout from the 2003
Desert Palace v. Costa1 decision on judicially-crafted frameworks for eval-
uating employment discrimination cases. Moreover, the Texas Supreme
Court removed an oft-utilized weapon from the arsenal of the plaintiffs'
bar by refusing to recognize an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim bottomed on the same conduct supporting a plaintiff's discrimina-
tion claim. Texas courts likewise spent 2004 crafting rules applicable to
the growing number of employers seeking to litigate disputes in arbitral
forums.
Additionally, this article discusses other noteworthy cases. This cate-
gory of cases includes discussion of Patrick v. Ridge2 and Johnson v. Loui-
siana,3 two federal cases focusing on the proof requirements under the
McDonnell Douglas4 minuet, and several decisions revealing how courts
continue to establish boundaries on employer efforts to litigate employ-
ment disputes in arbitral forums. Finally, we highlight some of the most
noteworthy undecided cases affecting employment law, such as the
ADEA disparate impact case of Smith v. City of Jackson,5 pending at the
United States Supreme Court, and the widely anticipated Texas Supreme
Court case of Alex Sheshnuoff Management Services v. Johnson,6 which
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1. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
2. 394 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2004).
3. 351 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2003).
4. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
5. 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003).
6. 129 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. granted).
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many practitioners hope will eliminate the darkness of Light v. Centel
Cellular.7
II. NOTEWORTHY DISCRIMINATION CASES
A. FEDERAL
1. Desert Palace-The Debate One Year Later
In last year's Survey, we examined Desert Palace v. Costa, wherein the
United States Supreme Court assessed whether the 1991 amendments to
Title VII affected jury instructions in "mixed motive" cases. 8 Prior to
Desert Palace, courts followed Justice O'Connor's concurring pre-amend-
ment opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins requiring "direct evidence"
of discrimination to warrant a mixed-motive instruction.9 In Desert Pal-
ace, however, the Court held that sufficient circumstantial or direct evi-
dence could warrant a mixed-motive instruction. 10 Before Desert Palace,
defendants feared "mixed-motive" cases because "direct evidence" was
often more inflammatory.
Though Desert Palace is a case about jury instructions, the ruling has
had the (likely) unintended effect of spawning a debate in the legal com-
munity as to whether the decision modified or even destroyed the long-
standing McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm used by courts to
decide motions for summary judgment." In last year's Survey, we high-
lighted the two interpretations of Desert Palace: (1) summary judgments
become harder to obtain for defendants because Desert Palace renders
the plaintiff's requirement of showing pretext irrelevant; or (2) Desert
Palace is a jury instruction case only and does nothing to alter summary
judgment practice and in fact provides employers an affirmative defense
in every jury trial allowing the jury to answer a question that could elimi-
nate substantially all of the plaintiff's compensatory and punitive
damages.
A year later, we have the benefit of examining how several district
courts have analyzed the meaning of Desert Palace. In Owens v. Excel
Management Services, Inc., which came out of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas, the court rejected any sugges-
tion that Desert Palace abrogated McDonnell Douglas burden shifting,
observing that the Court made no mention of McDonnell Douglas in De-
sert Palace, making the abrogation of such a long-standing and important
employment discrimination analytical framework unlikely.12 In Roz-
skowiak v. Village of Arlington Heights, the court granted the employer's
motion for summary judgment and stated that McDonnell Douglas is still
7. 883 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1974).
8. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
9. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
10. Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 101-02.
11. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
12. Owens v. Excel Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 3:02-CV-0523-L, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2887, *9 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2004).
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a viable framework for evaluating Title VII cases and, therefore, analyzed
the case under burden shifting. 13 In Herawi v. State of Alabama Depart-
ment of Forensic Sciences, the court stated that reports of the death of
McDonnell Douglas are greatly exaggerated. 14 But in Dare v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., the court reasoned that the McDonnell Douglas paradigm
put an unreasonable burden on the plaintiff, observing that the burden-
shifting scheme inevitably and paradoxically leads to a classic mixed-mo-
tive scenario that was exposed by Desert Palace.'5 And in both the Dun-
bar v. Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers of Iowa and Rishel v. Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co. cases, the courts concluded that Desert Palace at
least modified the third step of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm. 16 In
Louis v. E. Baton Rouge Parish School Board, the court observed that
"because the direct evidence requirement has been removed from mixed-
motives cases, it is now harder to draw a distinction between McDonnell
Douglas and mixed-motives cases.' 1
7
As will be shown below, the most cogent interpretation, though not
one yet adopted by the Fifth Circuit, of Desert Palace is that, in circum-
stantial cases, evidence of pretext is necessary in order to create an infer-
ence of discrimination. When there is direct evidence of discrimination,
there is no need to examine at the summary judgment stage whether
there is evidence to cast doubt on the employer's legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the employment decision. The direct evidence already
casts doubt on the employer's explanation and creates a fact issue. At
trial, however, the only question the jury must decide is whether the
plaintiff's protected trait motivated the employer to make its decision.
While there are many lower courts examining the implications of De-
sert Palace, for our purposes in this Survey, we highlight how judges in
two federal circuit courts-the Eighth and Fifth Circuits-have differed
in their respective critical assessments of Desert Palace.
In Griffith v. City of Des Moines, the plaintiff alleged on-going dispa-
rate treatment and retaliation by the City of Des Moines, its Fire Chief,
and its Assistant Fire Chief.' 8 Notably, in granting the City's motion for
summary judgment, the trial court observed that the Desert Palace deci-
sion "changed the burden-shifting landscape at the summary judgment
stage," and that plaintiffs are "no longer bound by the strictures of the
McDonnell Douglas framework."' 19
13. Rozskowiak v. Viii. of Arlington Heights, No. 01 C 5414, 2004 WL 816432 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 26, 2004).
14. Herawi v. Ala. Dep't of Forensic Scis., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1345 (M.D. Ala.
2004).
15. Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 992 (D. Minn. 2003).
16. Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1198 (D.
Iowa 2003); Rishel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 854, 866 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
17. Louis v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 303 F. Supp. 2d 799, 803 (M.D. La. 2003).
18. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 734 (8th Cir. 2003).
19. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, No. 4:01-CV-10537, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14440,
*3 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 6, 2003).
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit concluded that Desert Palace had no im-
pact on prior Eighth Circuit summary judgment decisions, explaining:
Direct evidence ... is not the converse of circumstantial evidence, as
many seem to assume. Rather, direct evidence is evidence "showing
a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the
challenged decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable
fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated" the ad-
verse employment action. [citation omitted] Thus, "direct" refers to
the causal strength of the proof, not whether it is "circumstantial"
evidence. A plaintiff with strong (direct) evidence that illegal dis-
crimination motivated the employer's adverse action does not need
the three-part McDonnell Douglas analysis to get to the jury, regard-
less of whether his strong evidence is circumstantial. But if the plain-
tiff lacks evidence that clearly points to the presence of an illegal
motive, he must avoid summary judgment by creating the requisite
inference of unlawful discrimination through the McDonnell Doug-
las analysis, including sufficient evidence of pretext.20
In the case of Griffith, the plaintiff produced no strong (direct) evi-
dence that racial or ethnic discrimination motivated any alleged adverse
employment action against him. Although the Fire Chief made insensitive
remarks about African American and women employees on other occa-
sions, the plaintiff presented no evidence that the Fire Chief, Assistant
Fire Chief, or any other city decision-maker ever uttered a single negative
ethnic remark about the plaintiff's Hispanic background. Therefore, the
requisite causal link between remarks reflecting racial or gender bias and
actions taken against him was lacking. Therefore, the court concluded the
plaintiff must produce sufficient circumstantial evidence of illegal dis-
crimination under the McDonnell Douglas paradigm.
Notably, in a special concurrence, Judge Magnuson wrote a separate
(and very detailed) explanation of his views about Desert Palace.21 Prior
to the 1991 amendments to Title VII, he explained, Congress prohibited
employment decisions motivated primarily by an improper characteristic
such as race or gender.2 2 Despite the 1991 amendments specifically mak-
ing unlawful the slightest consideration of race or other improper charac-
teristic, courts have continued to apply McDonnell Douglas-a test that
determined whether a discriminatory motive was the necessary and suffi-
cient cause of an employment decision, not one to determine whether a
discriminatory motive played a lesser role in the employment decision.23
The Desert Palace opinion, he observed, exposes the legal fiction for what
it is, and in its wake, it is error to "apply an arbitrary and antiquated test
that has been superseded by Congress. '2 4
20. Griffith, 387 F.3d at 736 (citing Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64,
66 (8th Cir. 1997)).
21. Id.





There is no need for a plaintiff to prove the more onerous single-
motive case, when all that Title VII requires a plaintiff to prove is
that discrimination was a motivating factor in the employment deci-
sion. Courts that insist that two frameworks still exist improperly cre-
ate a fictional dichotomy of "first degree discrimination" and
"second degree discrimination." The plain language of the statute
does not require a plaintiff to prove that discrimination was the "but-
for" cause of the employment decision, but rather requires a plaintiff
to demonstrate that discrimination was "a motivating" factor. There
is no evidence that Congress intended to create different degrees of
discrimination under Title VII. Although the statute entitles a plain-
tiff to damages beyond that articulated in § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), these
damages are only awarded if the defendant employer fails to prove
its affirmative defense that it would have made the same decision in
the absence of a discriminatory motive. This burden allows the de-
fendant employer to limit the plaintiff's remedy, but does not negate
liability. Thus, whether the employer has other nondiscriminatory
reasons which enter into the employment decision is wholly irrele-
vant to Title VII liability under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The
only rational conclusion is that no distinction between single and
mixed motives exists. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) applies to all individ-
ual disparate treatment cases.
25
Moreover, he explained, despite the context of the Desert Palace deci-
sion as a "jury instructions case," the practical effect of the decision none-
theless affects the analysis used at summary judgment because the
"reasonable jury standard" is the same as the summary judgment stan-
dard: whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable jury could logically infer that the adverse employment action
resulted from an improper consideration of a protected characteristic.
26
There is no support for the proposition that the Civil Rights Act of 1991
compels different analyses at different procedural stages of a Title VII
case.
27
Judge Magnuson recognized that pretext is circumstantial evidence that
may sufficiently demonstrate that an employer was motivated by an im-
proper consideration, but also observed that section 2000e-2(m) does not
require the plaintiff to prove pretext to prevail under Title VII:
Regardless if the plaintiff proves pretext or that discrimination was a
motivating factor, the plaintiff is entitled to the same damages for
Title VII liability. A plaintiff is entitled to damages beyond those
enumerated in § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) only if the defendant employer
cannot sustain its burden on its same-decision affirmative defense. If
the defendant employer cannot prove that there was an existing but-
for cause that would have created the same employment result, then
the plaintiff is entitled to greater damages. Thus, a plaintiff is no
25. Id. at 744-45.




worse off if he or she is unable to prove pretext.28
While both the majority and concurring judges in Griffith concluded
that there was no need to adopt a modified McDonnell Douglas ap-
proach, the Fifth Circuit came to a different conclusion in Rachid v. Jack
In The Box, Inc.29 There, the plaintiff, Ahmed P. Rachid, managed two
restaurants and shared managerial duties at one of the restaurants with
Khalil Haidar.30 According to both Rachid and Haidar, a supervisor re-
peatedly criticized Rachid and made disparaging comments about
Rachid's age. Rachid, who was fifty-two years old, reported these com-
ments to the company's human resources department and even requested
a transfer because he feared that the supervisor sought to fire him be-
cause of his age.31 The company did not approve the transfer and fired
Rachid. The company terminated Rachid after an investigation revealed
several employees under Rachid's supervision had improper alterations
of their time cards without Rachid completing the appropriate forms.32
Rachid brought a suit alleging age discrimination under the ADEA,
but after evaluating the case using the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, the
district court dismissed the case.33 On appeal, both parties contested
whether Desert Palace altered the analysis by allowing a plaintiff to pro-
ceed with a mixed-motive approach in a case where there is not direct
evidence of discrimination.34
Importantly, the Fifth Circuit concluded at the outset that the mixed-
motives analysis discussed in Desert Palace in the context of a Title VII
claim is equally applicable in the ADEA context.35 More importantly,
however, the court announced a "modified McDonnell Douglas ap-
proach" in light of Desert Palace:
The plaintiff must still demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion; the defendant then must articulate a legitimate, non-discrimina-
tory reason for its decision to terminate the plaintiff; and, if the
defendant meets its burden of production, the plaintiff must then of-
fer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact ei-
ther: (1) that the defendant's reason is not true, but is instead a
pretext for discrimination (pretext alternative); or (2) that the defen-
dant's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct,
and another 'motivating factor' is the plaintiff's protected character-
istic (mixed-motives alternative). 36
While the Fifth Circuit found genuine issues of fact under the third
prong, the court (regrettably for practitioners) failed to indicate which
28. Id. at 746.
29. Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004).
30. Id. at 307.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 308.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 310.
35. Id. at 311.
36. Id. at 312.
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avenue it took to reach this conclusion: (1) the court found issues of fact
existed regarding whether the policy plaintiff was allegedly terminated
for violating was actually a company policy and/or whether Rachid vio-
lated it (pretext alternative); and furthermore, (2) Rachid presented is-
sues of fact regarding the motivation of the decision-maker vis-A-vis
arguably ageist comments (mixed-motives alternative). 37
2. Title VII Cases
The plaintiffs in Frank v. Xerox Corp. filed several lawsuits against
Xerox under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that Xerox denied
them promotions and pay increases based on their African-American
race and forced them to work in a racially hostile work environment.
38
Plaintiffs pointed directly to Xerox's so-called Balanced Workforce Initia-
tive ("BWF"), implemented in the 1990s, for the stated purpose of insur-
ing that all racial and gender groups were proportionately represented at
all levels of the company. 39 The BWF targets were established on an
annual basis for each job and grade level and were based on government
labor force data. Throughout the time Xerox had the BWF in place,
Xerox produced reports listing the actual and desired racial and gender
compositions of each office. These reports indicated to the company that
blacks were over-represented and whites were under-represented in
Xerox's Houston office in comparison to the local population.
40
The district court ignored the existence of the BWF program and ap-
plied the McDonnell Douglas standard when it analyzed and dismissed
the plaintiffs' claims.41 The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the mere exis-
tence of the BWF program sufficient to constitute direct evidence of a
form or practice of discrimination. 42 The court observed that in its BWF
summary reports, Xerox candidly identified explicit racial goals for each
job and grade level.43 The BWF reports also stated that blacks were
over-represented and whites were under-represented in almost every job
and grade level at the Houston office. Senior staff notes and evaluations
also indicated that managers were evaluated on how well they complied
with the BWF objectives. "A jury looking at these facts could find that
Xerox considered race in fashioning its employment policies and that be-
cause the plaintiffs were black, their employment opportunities had been
limited."44
The plaintiffs also attempted to leverage the BWF target goals in mak-
ing their racially hostile work environment claims-that the BWF targets
were so intimidating, severe and pervasive, that it was objectively reason-
37. Id. at 313.
38. 347 F.3d 130, 132 (5th Cir. 2003).
39. Id. at 133.
40. Id.






able for them and other black employees to believe that they were in a
racially hostile work environment that precluded them from advancing to
a higher level because of their race. 45 Xerox countered, and the Fifth
Circuit agreed, that the plaintiff's subjective belief that the company in-
tended to use the BWF reports to avoid promoting and to terminate
black employees was not objectively reasonable, and therefore, they
could not satisfy the severe and pervasive requirements that are essential
to prove a hostile work environment claim.46 The court noted the ab-
sence of any precedent supporting the argument that the implementation
of an affirmative action plan equates to a hostile work environment.
The plaintiffs in Johnson v. Louisiana were a group of non-white appli-
cants seeking positions in the finance department at Louisiana State Uni-
versity Medical Center ("LSUMC"). 47 The minimum qualifications for
one of the desired positions at LSUMC were a bachelor's degree with
twenty-four semester hours in accounting and three years professional
level experience in accounting or financial auditing. The minimum quali-
fications for the other position sought were a bachelor's degree with
twenty-four semester hours in accounting and two years professional
level experience in administrative services, accounting, auditing, purchas-
ing, or staff development. The plaintiffs did not qualify for either of the
coveted positions as measured by the objective requirements. 48 There-
fore, the federal district court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish a
prima facie employment discrimination case because they did not show
themselves to be qualified for the coveted positions. 49
The Fifth Circuit reversed, observing that the prima facie case method
established in McDonnell Douglas was never intended to be rigid, mecha-
nized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly way to evalu-
ate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical
question of discrimination. 50 In this case, there was evidence that
LSUMC authorized the hiring of two employees to the coveted positions
despite the fact that neither satisfied the qualification requirements for
the position. Therefore, the trial court erred by deciding that the plaintiffs
failed to meet the stated job qualifications without also considering
whether such qualifications were applied to the two selected applicants. 51
The court reasoned that "allowing an employer to point to objective
requirements in arguing that a plaintiff is unqualified, even though the
requirements were not applied to other employees, would subvert the in-
tent of Title VII and McDonnell Douglas.52 To hold otherwise, courts
would be disallowed from remedying this type of discrimination because
45. Id. at 138.
46. Id.
47. 351 F.3d 616, 619 (5th Cir. 2003).
48. Id. at 620.
49. Id. at 619.
50. Id. at 622.




a plaintiff would never reach the later stage of the case if the unequal
application were not addressed at the prima facie stage.
53
In the case of Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the important question of whether an em-
ployer can utilize the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defenses in constructive
discharge cases, when "sexual harassment [is] ratcheted up to the break-
ing point."'5
4
The case arose out of Nancy Suders's employment as the communica-
tions operator for the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP). During her em-
ployment, she complained to the EEO officer about being the victim of a
continual barrage of sexual harassment by her supervisors, including sex-
ually explicit remarks, gestures, and behaviors. The EEO officer en-
couraged her to file a complaint but did not tell her how to obtain the
necessary forms to do so.
55
Later, Suders came upon her computer-skills exam papers in a drawer
in the women's locker room. Her supervisors had told her falsely that she
failed the exam, when in fact they never forwarded the exam for grading.
Anticipating that she would return the papers to the drawer, the supervi-
sors covered the drawer with theft-detection powder that turns blue when
touched. Suders was apprehended, handcuffed, photographed, and inter-
rogated when the blue powder appeared on her hands. When Suders in-
dicated her intent to resign from the PSP, she was released.
56
In an eight to one opinion, the Court confirmed what has been the rule
in many lower courts, although unstated by the Supreme Court-that
constructive discharge is prohibited by Title VII.57 More importantly, the
Court elaborated on the intersection of constructive discharge and the
availability of the affirmative defense pursuant to its 1998 rulings in
Faragher v. Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
("Fargher/Ellerth").58 Those cases hold that an employer is strictly liable
for supervisor harassment that "culminates in a tangible employment ac-
tion, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment," but
when no such tangible action is taken, the employer may raise an affirma-
tive defense to liability. To prevail on its defense, the employer must
show that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct
any sexually harassing behaviors and also that the employee unreasona-
bly failed to take advantage of preventative or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer. 5
9
53. Id.
54. Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 142 (2004) (applying the rationale ex-
pressed in Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)).
55. Id. at 134-35.
56. Id. at 135.
57. Id. at 139.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 136.
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The district court found that Suders' claim was untenable as a matter of
law because she unreasonably failed to avail herself of the employer's
anti-harassment procedures. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
agreed, holding that a constructive discharge constitutes a tangible em-
ployment action rendering the employer strictly liable, precluding
recourse to the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense.6 0
The answer provided by the Court as to whether an employer can be
held strictly liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment resulting in con-
structive discharge of the victim was: possibly.6' The Court clarified that a
constructive discharge can indeed constitute a tangible employment ac-
tion, but only if some official, employer-sanctioned, adverse action pre-
cipitated the resignation. 62 In so holding, the Court examined the
theoretical underpinnings of vicarious liability in Faragher/Ellerth: that an
employer is liable for the acts of its supervisor-agent when the supervisor
"was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency rela-
tion." Therefore, unlike injuries that could be equally inflicted by a co-
worker, a "tangible employment action" is one that falls "within the spe-
cial province of the supervisor," and is "in essential character, an official
act of the enterprise, a company act" and "the means by which the super-
visor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on
subordinates. 6 3
Thus, where an official act does not underlie the constructive discharge,
the Faragher/Ellerth analysis calls for the extension of the affirmative de-
fense because "absent an official act of the enterprise, as 'the last straw,'
the employer ordinarily would have no particular reason to suspect that a
resignation is not the typical kind daily occurring in the work force."' 64
And where uncertainty exists as to the degree to which the supervisor's
misconduct was aided by the agency relation, the employer should be af-
forded the chance to establish vis-A-vis the Faragher/Ellerth defense, that
it should not be held strictly liable.65
3. ADEA Cases
In a disparate treatment case, liability depends on whether the pro-
tected trait (such as age) actually motivated the employer's decision.
Proof of discriminatory motive is thus critical to the success of a plaintiff's
discriminatory treatment claim. In contrast, disparate impact claims arise
from employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than an-
other and cannot be justified by business necessity. The Supreme Court
recognized the legitimacy of a disparate impact theory under Title VII in
60. Id. at 137.
61. Id. at 140.
62. Id. at 134.





its 1971 Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ruling.66 However, in its 1993 opinion
in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, the Supreme Court admonished that "we
have never decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is avail-
able under the ADEA."67
The First, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits do not recognize dis-
parate impact claims under the ADEA, while the Second, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits do. In Smith v. City of Jackson, the Fifth Circuit widened
the circuit split in a case brought by thirty Jackson, Mississippi police of-
ficers and dispatchers, all over the age of forty, alleging that they were
adversely impacted by the implementation of a new performance pay
plan granting larger salary increases to younger employees. 68
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary
judgment for the city, holding that "the ADEA was not intended to rem-
edy age-disparate effects that arise from the application of employment
plans or practices that are not based on age."' 69 The Fifth Circuit found
significant differences in the statutory language between Title VII and the
ADEA, like section 623(f) of the ADEA which provides an exclusion of
liability if the adverse employment action is "based on reasonable factors
other than age."'70
While disparate impact claims under the ADEA are not cognizable in
the Fifth Circuit, this rule could be short-lived because the United States
Supreme Court granted review of the decision in order to clarify the cir-
cuit split. The Supreme Court previously granted review in December
2001 of the Eleventh Circuit's Adams v. Florida Power Corp. decision,
but twelve days after oral arguments were heard the Court dismissed the
case as "improvidently granted. '71 At the time of submission of this Sur-
vey, the Supreme Court has heard oral arguments but has not issued its
ruling.
In General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the ADEA does not recognize "reverse age
discrimination claims."'72 Thus, Cline stands for the proposition that the
ADEA permits employer preferences for the over-forty old versus the
over-forty young.
According to the Court, discrimination based on an "individual's age"
can mean different things depending on the context-"age" could mean
how old or young someone is, or it could mean "old age." Therefore, the
Court had to determine exactly how Congress meant to use the word
"age." Based on the legislative history and the fact that the ADEA itself
only prohibits age discrimination against people who are forty years of
age or older, the Court concluded that Congress meant to prohibit dis-
66. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
67. 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
68. 351 F.3d 183, 184-85 (5th Cir. 2003), affd on other grounds, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).
69. Id. at 187.
70. Id. at 189.
71. 535 U.S. 228 (2002).
72. 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004).
2005]
SMU LAW REVIEW
crimination based only on old age. The majority reasoned, in part, that
Congress could not have intended to prohibit discrimination based on
how young or old someone is as well as old age because the likely victims
of stereotypes about youth will be substantially younger than forty.73
In Patrick v. Ridge, the Fifth Circuit reminded employers that it will
scrutinize the second step of the McDonnell Douglas minuet.74 In that
case, the plaintiff, Clara Patrick, who worked for the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), was denied promotion. The job was given
to one of her co-workers who was more than ten years her junior, and
Patrick filed a charge and lawsuit against the INS. 75
During the pendancy of her lawsuit, the same position became availa-
ble and she again applied for the position. The INS selected the plaintiff
and five other internal applicants as interview finalists, but after consider-
ing these applicants, the agency decided against selecting any of the inter-
nal candidates and instead interviewed an external candidate. The
external candidate was ultimately chosen to fill the position because, ac-
cording to the INS, she was the "best qualified" for the position. Patrick
amended her complaint, adding new charges of age discrimination and
retaliation grounded in the agency's decision to deny her the promotion
and hire the external candidate instead, but the trial court dismissed her
claims.76
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit first scrutinized the agency's first reason
offered for its decision against selecting the plaintiff-that she was "not
sufficiently suited" for the position. The court admonished the agency for
failing to clarify or expand on how Patrick was not "sufficiently suited for
the job."'77 The agency failed to provide any "explanation of what this
means and produced no specifics for why Patrick would not fit in with the
group. ' 78 While subjective reasons are permissible, the Court observed,
offering such a "vague and conclusional feeling" about an employee is a
"non-reason" and does not meet the burden of articulating a nondiscrimi-
natory reason "with sufficient clarity to afford the employee a realistic
opportunity to show that the reason is pretextual. '79
The Court also scrutinized the agency's second reason for its decision-
that the external candidate was the "best qualified." The court observed
that for purposes of a plaintiff's discrimination and retaliation claims, the
relevant time frame is the time of the decision adverse to the complaining
applicant.80 Therefore, when the agency opted to forgo promoting Pat-
rick and decided to interview the external candidate, the external candi-
date's allegedly superior qualifications were unknown. Therefore, it
73. Id. at 591-98.
74. Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2004).





80. Id. at 318.
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cannot be said that the external candidate's qualifications in any way mo-
tivated the agency's adverse decision regarding Patrick.81 As such, a jus-
tification that could not have motivated the employer's decision is not
evidence that tends to illuminate the ultimate issue-the employer's rea-
soning at the moment the questioned employment decision is made.82
4. ADA Cases
The case of Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez arose when plaintiff, Joel Her-
nandez, was forced to resign from the company after he had been given a
drug test and tested positive for cocaine. 83 Three years later, Hernandez
sought to be rehired by Hughes Missile Systems Co., which became Ray-
theon Co., indicating on the application that he had previously worked
for the company and attaching a letter from his treatment counselor stat-
ing that he was in recovery and regularly attended treatment meetings.
The company rejected Hernandez's application, and Hernandez filed a
charge of discrimination alleging that the denial was in violation of the
ADA. Although the ADA does not protect persons currently engaging in
illegal drug use, the ADA provides that an individual does not forfeit
ADA protection if he is a rehabilitated drug user or participates in a su-
pervised rehabilitation program.84
In response, the company said it denied Hernandez's application be-
cause of "his demonstrated drug use while previously employed and the
complete lack of evidence indicating successful drug rehabilitation. '85
The EEOC issued a "reasonable cause" determination, and Hernandez
subsequently filed suit alleging that the company wrongfully rejected his
employment application because of his record of drug addiction or be-
cause he was regarded as being a drug addict, in violation of the ADA.86
The company sought to dismiss the case on a motion for summary judg-
ment on the grounds of its policy against rehiring employees who had
been terminated or resigned in lieu of termination for misconduct, includ-
ing illegal drug use. Hernandez responded with a new disparate impact
argument: that if the company applied a neutral no rehire policy, such a
policy had a disparate impact upon rehabilitated drug addicts. The court
granted the company's motion and refused to consider the disparate im-
pact argument as untimely. 87
The Ninth Circuit agreed that the disparate impact claim was untimely
but reversed the district court's ruling regarding the disparate treatment
claim. The court concluded that the no rehire policy was facially lawful
but unlawful as applied to former drug addicts whose only work-related
offense was testing positive because of their addiction. Therefore, the
81. Id. at 319.
82. Id.
83. 540 U.S. 44, 46-47 (2003).
84. Id. at 47.
85. Id. at 48.




company could not rely upon the policy in meeting its burden under the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm.88
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether "the
ADA confers preferential rehire rights to disabled employees lawfully
terminated for violating work place conduct rules." 89 The Court found
that the company's proffer of its neutral no rehire policy satisfied its Mc-
Donnell Douglas burden of providing a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason for refusing to rehire Hernandez. Moreover, the Court said that
the company's no rehire policy is "a quintessential legitimate non-dis-
criminatory reason for refusing to rehire an employee who was termi-
nated for violating workplace conduct rules." 90 If the policy motivated
the decision, the decision could not have been illegally motivated by his
disability, and therefore, the Court remanded the case to determine
whether Hemandez could produce sufficient evidence to conclude that
this reason was pretext for discrimination.91
While the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision and ruled that an
employer could rely upon a neutral, generally applicable policy prohibit-
ing the rehire of former employees who had been terminated for violating
workplace conduct rules, the Court left open the possibility of attacking
such policies under a disparate impact analysis. Under this theory, an
employer would have to defend the use of the no rehire policy as being
job related and consistent with business necessity.
5. Section 1981
In Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., the United States Supreme
Court addressed a seemingly easy question: what statute of limitations
applies to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981?92 That statute, like
many federal laws, does not provide a statute of limitations, and in its
1987 Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. decision, the Court held that courts
should apply "the most appropriate or analogous state statute of limita-
tions" to section 1981 claims.93 Three years after the Goodman decision,
however, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1658 providing a catch-all four-
year statute of limitations for actions "arising under" federal statutes en-
acted after December 1, 1990.94
The plaintiffs, African-American employees of the printing company
R.R. Donnelley & Sons brought a class action claiming racial harassment
under section 1981. According to the Court's 1989 decision in Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union, section 1981's statutory right to make and en-
force contracts did not protect employees from harassing conduct that
88. Id. at 51.
89. Id. at 51-52.
90. Id. at 54-55.
91. Id. at 55.
92. 541 U.S. 369 (2004); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991).
93. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660 (1987).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (1990).
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occurred after the formation of the contract. 95 Congress, however, dis-
agreed and overturned the Patterson decision with the 1991 Civil Rights
Act that added a new subsection (b) to section 1981 defining the phrase
"make and enforce contracts" to include the "termination of contracts
and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the
contractual relationship.
96
The question in Jones, therefore, was whether the plaintiff's claims of
racial harassment, only cognizable as a result of the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
were governed by the state statute of limitations or by the four-year limi-
tations period found in 28 U.S.C. § 1658. The Third, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits concluded that section 1658 could not apply to a cause of action
based on a post-1990 amendment to a pre-existing statute, while the Sixth
and Tenth Circuits ruled that section 1658 could apply.
The Supreme Court concluded that nothing in the text or history of
section 1658 limited its reach to entirely new sections of the United States
Code, explaining that "an amendment to an existing statute is no less an
'Act of Congress' than a new, stand-alone statute. ' 97 Moreover, what
matters, the Court observed, "is the substantive effect of an enactment-
the creation of new rights of action and corresponding liabilities-not the
format in which it appears in the Code."'98 Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that a cause of action arises under an act of Congress enacted after
December 1, 1990, and is therefore governed by section 1658 if the plain-
tiff's claim against the defendant was made possible by a post-1990 enact-
ment.99 Thus, the plaintiff's claims arose under the 1991 Civil Rights Act
(a post-1990 Act) in the sense that the claims were made possible only by
that Act, following the interpretation of section 1981 in Patterson.1°°
Because the plaintiff's claims did not allege a violation of the pre-1990
version of section 1981 but did allege violations of the amended version
of that statute, those claims "arose under" the amendment to section 1981
contained in the 1991 Civil Rights Act and are subject to the four-year
limitations period of section 1658.101 What the Court left unanswered,
however, is what limitations period applies (section 1658 or "the most
appropriate state law") where the lawsuit involves Patterson-cognizable
claims as well as claims covered by the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
The defendant in Bryan v. McKinsey & Co. maintained an "up or out"
advancement system, meaning that an employee is either promoted or
terminated, and only a small number reach partner status. The plaintiff
was hired to an entry level "associates" position in 1996 and was pro-
moted several times, acquiring the position of "associate principal" in
2000. The plaintiff's group leader, who was responsible for assessing his
95. 491 U.S. 164, 177 (1989).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (1991).







progress and determining whether the plaintiff was ready to advance,
gave the plaintiff an "undeniably positive" evaluation in December 2000,
but also questioned his ability to bring new clients to the firm to justify
his position and further promotion. 102
For several months thereafter, the plaintiff failed to generate new busi-
ness and one client requested that he be removed from a project. In
April 2001, the partners terminated the plaintiff's employment for failing
to meet their performance expectations. The plaintiff filed suit under sec-
tion 1981 claiming the company treated him differently because he was
African-American. In support, he said that terminated white employees
were given more time to improve and were given more evaluations and
feedback from group leaders.10 3
A divided Fifth Circuit panel upheld the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for the company because the plaintiff failed to show that he was
treated differently than sixteen similarly situated non-black employees-
six were terminated, one resigned, another was moved to a non-partner-
ship track, and eight were still employed.10 4 Moreover, the court ex-
plained that the differential treatment reflected "the uniqueness of each
employee's situation. '10 5
Moreover, the court said evidence that white employees were allowed
to stay on the job longer is not evidence of the falsity of the company's
proffered reason; rather, it is evidence that similarly situated employees
were terminated for legitimate reasons at a different time than the plain-
tiff was terminated for legitimate reasons. 106 Therefore, the "up or out"
policy was not shown to have been applied in a discriminatory fashion.
B. TEXAS
1. Texas Commission on Human Rights Cases
In last year's Survey, we highlighted the significant opinion of Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola issued by the Texas Supreme Court. 107 In
that disability discrimination case, the supreme court explained that
under the TCHRA, the relevant inquiry is not whether legitimate nondis-
criminatory reasons for the plaintiff's adverse action were a pretext, "but
what they were a pretext for.' 08 Because there was no evidence that
Wal-Mart was motivated to terminate the plaintiff because of his heart
condition, even if the reasons given by Wal-Mart were false, the plaintiff's
discrimination claim failed. 109
102. Bryan v. McKinsey & Co., 375 F.3d 358, 359-60 (5th Cir. 2004).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 361-62.
105. Id. at 362.
106. Id.
107. 121 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003).




In Pineda v. UPS, the plaintiff suffered from diabetes and took a leave
of absence to treat his condition. While on leave, the employee filed a
charge of disability discrimination against the employer for allegedly de-
laying his return to work. The employee was subsequently transferred to
another facility. While working at the new facility, the employee was
charged with threatening violence against co-workers. The employer in-
vestigated the charges and ultimately fired the employee, and the plaintiff
subsequently filed a retaliation suit under the TCHRA in state court.1 10
After being removed to federal court, the court denied the employer's
motion for judgment as a matter of law both before the jury verdict and
after.11 1
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit first assessed whether, in retaliation cases
where the defendant has proffered a nondiscriminatory purpose for the
adverse employment action, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that
'but for' the discriminatory purpose he would not have been termi-
nated.1 1 2 Relying on the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Quantum
Chemical Corp. v. Toennies, the plaintiff argued that the applicable causa-
tion requirement under the TCHRA is the less stringent "motivating fac-
tor" test, rather than the more stringent "but for" test.
113
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, supporting its conclusion with a thoroughly
detailed analysis of the language of the TCHRA. The court first pointed
out that when the Texas Supreme Court held in Quantum Chemical that
"a motivating factor" was the causation requirement for all employment
discrimination cases, that meant that the standard was the applicable
standard in both pretext and mixed motive employment discrimination
cases where section 21.125(a) was applicable. 114 That holding, the Fifth
Circuit explained, is not as broad as it first appears because section
21.125(a) is not applicable in all employment discrimination cases under
the TCHRA. 115
Texas Labor Code section 21.125(a) is inapplicable to retaliation cases
brought under section 21.055 because section 21.125(a), by its own terms,
is only applicable when the alleged discrimination is based on race, color,
sex, national origin, religion, age, or disability. Because the Quantum
Chemical court stated that "if section 21.125 does not apply . . . the
proper standard of causation ... would be the "but for" test," and be-
cause a retaliation claim is not based on section 21.125, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the "but for" test was applicable in retaliation claims
under the TCHRA.116
More importantly, in applying the "but for" causation standard, the
Fifth Circuit considered whether the plaintiff satisfied his burden in light
110. Pineda v. UPS, 360 F.3d 483, 486 (5th Cir. 2004).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 487.
113. Id.; Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 479-80 (Tex. 2001).





of the Canchola holding. 117 The plaintiff's case consisted solely of evi-
dence suggesting that the company's investigation came to an incorrect
conclusion and was potentially motivated by concerns other than the pre-
vention of workplace violence. 118 After Canchola, the Fifth Circuit ob-
served, the plaintiff was required (and failed) to present evidence "that
independently suggests that [the employer] falsely and selectively fired
him because he engaged in protected activity, or that had he not engaged
in that activity he would not have been terminated. It is [the plaintiff's]
burden to present evidence demonstrating that he was fired for a prohib-
ited reason." 119 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit concluded, the plaintiff's
TCHRA retaliation claim failed as a matter of law. 120
Craig Winters, the plaintiff in Winters v. Chubb & Son, Inc., was hired
as an underwriter, and he was subsequently transferred to another section
under the supervision of Deanne Gordon. After performance issues
arose, Winters was issued a verbal warning and his underwriting authority
was revoked. The revocation, however, did not alter his official duties,
pay or job title. He was permitted to continue underwriting but new
lines or renewals had to be signed-off by a supervisor. 121
After several months of up-and-down performance and proposed ac-
tion plans to improve his performance, Winters tendered his resignation
and subsequently sued for race discrimination under the TCHRA. Win-
ters argued that other non-black employees exhibited similar perform-
ance problems, such as underwriting accounts that lose money, lost
accounts, and customer complaints, but were not disciplined. 122 Winters
also alleged that he had a strained relationship with Gordon and that
Gordon did not like blacks, pointing to two statements proving racial ani-
mus and pretext: (1) a statement by another supervisor that he thought
blacks struggled at the company and that he thought it was a cultural
issue, and (2) Winters said Gordon told him "I'm going to get you," and
"I don't like you. ' 1 2 3
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant, and Win-
ters appealed. On appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals in Houston con-
firmed that "proving pretext for discrimination requires the plaintiff to
show both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real
reason. '"124 The court held that while there was a fact issue as to whether
he was constructively discharged, there was very little evidence, besides
Winters's subjective belief, to show that race was a motivating factor. 125
117. Id. at 490.
118. Id. at 489.
119. Id. at 490.
120. Id.
121. 132 S.W.3d 568, 571-72 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
122. Id. at 576-78.
123. Id. at 577.




First, to establish that he received disparate treatment, he was required
to "demonstrate that the preferential treatment was given under 'nearly
identical' circumstances"-that he was discharged for misconduct for
which others were not.12 6 Here, the court concluded that Winters "suf-
fered from a unique combination of performance issues. ' 127 The court
found that there was some evidence that other underwriters committed
the same errors as Winters, but there was no evidence that another em-
ployee exhibited the "same list of performance issues as Winters," and no
"specific evidence of another employee committing the same range of er-
rors made by Winters."'21 8 A disagreement between an employer and em-
ployee, the court explained, even an incorrect belief that the employee's
performance is deficient, constitutes a legitimate nondiscriminatory rea-
son for termination which the court would not second guess. 129
Second, the court rejected the statements as evidence of racial animus
or pretext. The statement by another supervisor that he thought blacks
struggled at the company and that he thought it was a cultural issue was
not probative of discrimination, the court explained, because it was made
by someone without input or authority over Winters's job status and it
was made after a black trainee from another unit resigned. Moreover,
the statements by Gordon did not relate to Winters's protected class.130
Just as the Fifth Circuit ruled in Smith v. City of Jackson that disparate
impact claims were not cognizable under the ADEA, the Texas Court of
Appeals came to the same conclusion for age discrimination claims under
the TCHRA in Texas Parks & Wildlife Department v. Dearing.13' Milburn
Dearing filed a complaint with the Texas Commission on Human Rights
alleging that the reclassification of the grandfathered Game Wardens V
from the C-7 to the C-6 pay level constituted age discrimination because
it had a disproportionate impact on employees over the age of forty, be-
cause none of the other sergeant positions at the department were reclas-
sified. The complaint asserted a class-action claim. 132
Because the TCHRA directs courts to follow judicial interpretation of
the ADEA in determining the availability of a state disparate-impact the-
ory, the court relied heavily on the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Smith.133
Dearing insists that the reasoning of the Smith court is irrelevant because,
unlike the federal scheme, the Texas legislature chose to prohibit age dis-
crimination in the same statute that prohibits discrimination based on
race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or disability, and thus disparate-
impact claims should apply equally to all claims of discrimination. How-
126. Id. at 578.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 579.
129. Id. at 578.
130. Id. at 577-78.
131. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Dearing, 150 S.W.3d 452 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004,
pet. denied), cert. denied, No. 04-451, 2005 WL 742625 (U.S. Apr. 4, 2005); Smith v. City of
Jackson, 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003).
132. Dearing, 150 S.W.3d at 456.
133. Id. at 463-56.
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ever, the court observed that to so hold would ignore section 21.122,
which states that disparate-impact claims are available for age discrimina-
tion in this state only if they are available under the ADEA.1
3 4
Furthermore,
the language in the Act-added in 1995-mirrors the language ad-
ded to Title VII in 1991 codifying disparate-impact cases under Title
VII, except that the Texas Act treats disparate impact on the basis of
age distinctly by removing it from the list of other forms of discrimi-
nation that give rise to disparate-impact liability.135
Therefore, as in Smith, there is no disparate-impact theory of liability
under the Texas Act.136
III. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was adopted in 1938 as a means
of economic recovery from the Great Depression and was designed to
ensure a maximum number of jobs paying a minimum, livable wage-
taking citizens out of the bread lines and into productive jobs. The most
obvious example of the job creation motives underlying the FLSA is the
statute's requirement that an employer pay one and one-half of an em-
ployee's "regular hourly rate" for hours worked in excess of forty hours
per week. Therefore, if an employer has eighty hours of work to be done,
the employer is financially encouraged to employ two workers instead of
one to perform the work.
Importantly, employees who do not qualify for any of the exemptions
from overtime pay under the FLSA must receive overtime. While this
principle seems axiomatic, it reveals one of the most dangerous areas of
wage and hour law in terms of potential liability-the incorrect classifica-
tion of employees as exempt workers. Liability can be great because the
employer must pay the employee overtime for all hours worked in excess
of forty per week going back up to three years, and because many em-
ployers do not keep track of hours worked, many employers may find
themselves ill-equipped to rebut employee's often exaggerated claims of
overtime pay owed.
Section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA provides a complete overtime pay ex-
emption for any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administra-
tive, or professional capacity, as those terms are defined in the relevant
federal regulations. These are commonly referred to as the "white collar"
exemptions and are the most common exemptions asserted by employers.
It is therefore worth highlighting in this Survey that the most notable
FLSA-related guidance in 2004 did not come from the judiciary, rather, it
came from the Department of Labor's new regulations issued in April






tions to the overtime pay laws to more accurately reflect the modern ser-
vice economy workforce.
It has been widely debated whether or not the new regulations expand
or contract the scope of the exemptions (and some of that debate oc-
curred in the arena of the 2004 presidential campaigns). While it is our
goal here to simply draw attention to the significant change in the FLSA
landscape, the rules have changed and lawyers must understand the new
regulations to properly advise clients.
In Carter v. Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc., current and former em-
ployees of the consumer mortgage provider filed a collective action in
federal court alleging that they were unlawfully denied overtime pay. 137
The employer sought to compel arbitration because each employee
signed an agreement to arbitrate disputes as a condition of employment.
The employees disagreed, arguing that their right to a judicial forum for
FLSA claims could not be waived, that arbitration would interfere with
their substantive FLSA rights to proceed collectively, that the cost-shar-
ing provision effectively prevented them from vindicating their claims,
and that a Ninth Circuit ruling involving Countrywide and an identical
arbitration agreement found the agreements to be unconscionable. The
district court, however, severed the cost-sharing provision pursuant to a
severability clause in the agreements, ordered the company to bear all
arbitration costs, and granted the employer's motion to compel
arbitration.138
On appeal, the employees made the same arguments, but the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the employees failed to meet their burden of overcoming
the "strong presumption" in favor of arbitration necessary to invalidate
the arbitration agreements.' 39 Reminded by the Supreme Court's ruling
in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. that courts must enforce the
parties' commitment to arbitrate federal statutory claims unless a show-
ing can be made that Congress intended to preclude arbitration, the Fifth
Circuit observed that such preclusion has seldom been found. 140 Moreo-
ver, nothing in the FLSA's text or legislative history counseled against
arbitration, and the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have reached the same
conclusion.
In rejecting the employees' argument that they were deprived of their
right to proceed collectively under the FLSA, the Fifth Circuit observed
that the Gilmer court rejected arguments that the inability to proceed
collectively in arbitration constituted a deprivation of a substantive statu-
tory right.' 4 ' And the fact that the employees would have to share the
costs of arbitration was mooted by an October 2000 memorandum to all
employees stating that they would only have to pay a $125 filing fee for
137. 362 F.3d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 2004).
138. Id.
139. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
140. Carter, 362 F.3d at 297.
141. Id. at 298.
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arbitration and that the company would pay all the other arbitration
costs.
In response to the employees arguments that the Ninth Circuit found
an identical arbitration agreement unconscionable, the Fifth Circuit ob-
served that the Ninth Circuit's ruling relied on California law, not Texas
law, and in Texas, "there is nothing per se unconscionable about arbitra-
tion agreements," while in California "a contract to arbitrate between an
employer and an employee raises a rebuttable presumption of substantive
unconscionability."1 42
While Kanida v. Gulf Coast Medical Personnel is an FLSA retaliation
case, its import is equally applicable to Title VII cases. 143 In Kanida, the
plaintiff complained that she was owed overtime, and after reviewing her
records, the company offered to compensate her for the unpaid wages.
The plaintiff refused and filed a complaint with the Department of Labor
(DOL). The plaintiff subsequently filed a lawsuit claiming that she re-
ceived reprimands, salary decreases, and denial of accommodations in re-
taliation for the DOL complaint. Despite the plaintiff's request, the trial
court failed to instruct the jury that "if the plaintiff disproves the reasons
offered by Defendants by a preponderance of the evidence, you may pre-
sume that the employer was motivated by retaliation." The jury ruled in
favor of the company.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court's refusal to give a
"permissive pretext" instruction to the jury was erroneous. 144 The con-
cept of "permissive pretext" arose out of the U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products Inc., holding that jurors
are permitted to, but need not, infer that an employer's actions regarding
an employee were based on a prohibited motivation from evidence that
the reasons the employer gave for its actions were mere pretext. 145 The
First, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits do not mandate the instruction in
Title VII cases, while the Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits require that
the instruction be given.
The Kanida panel stated that due to its 2001 holding in Ratliff v. City of
Gainesville, it was bound to conclude that the trial court did err by not
providing the instruction, but that the error was not prejudicial. Interest-
ingly, the court urged en banc review and explained that without the Rat-
liff holding, it would have approved the trial court's instruction as an
accurate statement of the law. 146
IV. FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
In last year's Survey, we highlighted the case of Urban v. Dolgencorp
of Texas, Inc. wherein the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
142. Id.
143. 363 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2004).
144. Id. at 572.
145. 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000).
146. Kanida, 363 F.3d 578-79.
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Texas ruled that the employer had not complied with the relevant FMLA
regulations regarding the plaintiff's right to cure deficiencies in the medi-
cal documentation she submitted supporting her request for leave. 14 7 It
was undisputed that the plaintiff provided the employer with proper no-
tice of her intent to request FMLA leave and that the employer re-
quested medical certification and apprised the employee of the
consequences she would face if her medical certification was not timely
submitted. It was also undisputed that the employee gave the certifica-
tion form to her doctor but the doctor (and the plaintiff) failed to submit
documentation of any kind to the employer within the specified deadline
after being notified to do so. The employee was also given more than the
fifteen-day period to provide the necessary documentation and, in fact,
received an extension from the employer in order to do so.
The sole issue, therefore, was whether the curing provision found in 29
C.F.R. § 825.305(d) applied when an employee failed to submit a medical
certification to the employer altogether. 148 The plaintiff maintained that
her "reasonable opportunity to cure any such deficiency," pursuant to
section 825.305(d), was entirely dependent upon the employer advising
her that the certification form had not been received. The plaintiff argued
that it was impracticable for her to re-contact her doctor and cure the
problem until after she was informed of the failure by the company. On
the other side, the company argued that it fully complied with all relevant
statutory and regulatory requirements-it went as far as granting the
plaintiff's request for a fifteen-day extension of time from the original
deadline within which to return the completed medical certification form,
which neither the FMLA nor section 825.305(d) requires. Moreover, the
company contended that it was plaintiff's responsibility, as an employee
seeking the protections of the FMLA, and not her doctor's responsibility,
to ensure that her medical certification was timely filed.
In a case of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, the court concluded
that the company satisfied its obligations under the FMLA and reversed
the district court's grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff.149 The
court observed that adopting the plaintiff's application of section
825.305(d) would result in no real deadline ever arising for the return of a
medical certification:
In effect, whenever an employee failed to return a medical certifica-
tion within the appropriate time period, the employer would be re-
quired to notify the employee of that fact and provide the employee
with an opportunity to cure the deficiency by allowing the employee
to submit the certification within a new, extended deadline - a scena-
rio that could, in theory, repeat itself ad infinitum. The bottom line,
therefore, would be that the concept of a "deadline" under
§ 825.305(d) would have no meaningful significance and no actual
147. No. 1:02-CV-212-C, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15334, at *8-10 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6,
2003).
148. Id. at *2-3, *8.




Such a rule would be incongruous with the balance Congress intended
to strike in enacting the FMLA between "the demands of the workplace
with the needs of families" and "to entitle employees to take reasonable
leave for medical reasons" in a "manner that accommodates the legiti-
mate interests of employers." Therefore, the court reasoned, "it would
seem illogical to require an employer to continually notify an employee
who failed to submit medical certification within a specified deadline." 151
In Horelica v. Fiserv Solutions, Inc., Barbara Horelica was advised by
her doctor that she would need surgery to correct a problem involving
foot pain, and surgery was scheduled for eighteen days after the date on
which the doctor recommended it.152 One day before it was performed,
Horelica informed her employer that she was going to have a medical
procedure performed the next day and would not be at work. Horelica
did not tell the employer the length of time she would need to be away,
explain the nature of her condition, or explain the treatment she was to
receive. She also never submitted a written request for leave. After the
surgery was performed, she tried unsuccessfully to reach her supervisor
via telephone. When Horelica did not return to work during the next two
weeks, she was terminated for "job abandonment. '153
Horelica sued the company for discriminating against her for taking
leave pursuant to the FMLA, but the trial court granted the employer's
summary judgment motion. On appeal, Horelica claimed error regarding
one issue-that she provided the requisite notice under the statute, and
was entitled to the protection afforded by the FMLA.
154
The FMLA, the court explained, requires that thirty days' notice be
given the employer when leave is foreseeable, and "if 30 days' notice is
not feasible, such as because of a lack of knowledge of approximately
when leave will be required to begin, a change in circumstance, or a medi-
cal emergency, the employee must provide such notice as is practica-
ble."' 155 For foreseeable leave, "as soon as practicable" means "at least
verbal notification to the employer within one or two business days of
when the need for leave becomes known to the employee. ' 156 Because
Horelica failed to meet her notice requirement, she was not entitled to
FMLA protections.1 57
Marilyn Haley, the plaintiff in Haley v. Alliance Compressor LLC, re-
ceived high performance ratings from supervisors during the first two
years on the job, but an employee survey revealed some negative com-
ments directed towards her and the Human Resources (H.R.) depart-
150. Id. at *14.
151. Id.
152. 123 S.W.3d 492, 494 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 495-96.
155. Id. at 496.




ment where she worked. 158 After some restructuring, Haley met with her
supervisor, Jeff Risinger, to discuss performance issues, which were docu-
mented. A few weeks later, Haley's physician recommended that she
take a leave of absence for a stress/anxiety disorder believed to be work-
related, and the company subsequently approved the leave request. Dur-
ing her leave, Risinger approved an increase in Haley's salary.
A few weeks into her leave, Haley's performance issues arose as a topic
of conversation among Risinger and Bob Anderson, Vice President of
H.R. Anderson testified that they discussed preparations for her return
and what she needed to work on, while Risinger said Anderson wanted
Risinger to eliminate Haley's job before she returned. Haley's job was
not eliminated, but on the day when Haley returned, she was confronted
with her performance issues and given a performance improvement plan.
Risinger, who was in the process of resigning, told Haley that Anderson
and other managers were not happy with her taking a leave of absence
and informed her of the aborted plan to eliminate her job during her
leave.
Haley alleged that after she returned to work, she was micromanaged,
meetings were held without her, and she was given late notices of sched-
uled telephone conferences. Haley subsequently resigned and filed a law-
suit claiming interference with FMLA rights and FMLA retaliation, but
the district court granted the company's summary judgment motion be-
cause no fact issue existed as to constructive discharge.
On review, the Fifth Circuit provided a thorough analysis of the evi-
dence necessary to establish constructive discharge in the FMLA con-
text.159 The court reiterated Haley's burden to meet the objective
"reasonable employee" test, but also confirmed that a greater degree of
harassment than that required by a hostile environment claim must be
shown, and that aggravating factors must be proved, such as "hostile
working conditions or the employer's invidious intent to create or perpet-
uate the intolerable conditions compelling the resignation. ' 160 Haley ar-
gued that knowledge of the company's intent, evidenced by what Risinger
told her, was relevant to whether a reasonable person in her position
would have felt pushed into resignation. She also argued that the com-
pany manifested its intent to force her resignation by fabricating deficien-
cies in her performance, setting an overly strict performance plan,
micromanaging her, excluding her from meetings, and ridiculing her in
front of co-workers.
The company, however, argued that any evidence of employer intent
was irrelevant at the reasonable employee test stage. The Fifth Circuit
rejected this argument and held that manifestations of employer intent
are relevant to the reasonable employee analysis-determining whether
supporting aggravating factors exist is part and parcel of the reasonable
158. 391 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 2004).
159. Id. at 648-53.




The real issue, the court explained, is whether a reasonable employee
who received similar information about what happened while on leave,
including the evidence regarding employer intent, would have felt com-
pelled to quit.162 Citing several pior cases affirming summary judgment,
the court said no-based on the evidence, no reasonable jury could con-
clude that Haley was compelled to resign.163 The court pointed out that
Haley was not demoted, received a salary increase, had the same (albeit
more focused) job responsibilities, was not assigned menial or degrading
work, and was favorably accommodated when the company changed her
schedule to her physician-requested forty-hour work weeks.' 64
All that remained, the court observed, were Haley's allegations about
being the victim of a sarcastic remark at a meeting and being
micromanaged, which the court held were insufficient as a matter of law
to qualify as the type of "badgering, harassment, or humiliation" neces-
sary to support a constructive discharge allegation. 165
V. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR)
Whether the benefits associated with arbitration outweigh the detri-
ments is a topic we leave for others to pursue. Here, we highlight several
noteworthy cases contributing to the burgeoning body of law assisting the
pursuit of employment-related arbitration.
In the case of J.M. Davidson Inc. v. Webster, employee Chelsey Web-
ster claimed that her termination was in retaliation for her filing a work-
ers' compensation claim, in violation of section 451 of the Texas Labor
Code. 166 Because Webster had signed the company's ADR policy two
weeks after being hired, the company sought to compel arbitration of
Webster's claim. The trial court, however, denied the employer's motion
to compel arbitration under its ADR policy, a ruling affirmed by the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals. The appellate court reasoned that the
ADR policy was illusory because it was not binding on both parties when
the employer retained the right to modify or terminate the policy at any
time.167
Writing for the majority, Justice Jefferson admonished that, according
to its 2002 decision in Halliburton Co., an ADR agreement between an
employer and at-will employee was not illusory. 168 In Halliburton, the
employer's right to modify or terminate the agreement could only be ap-
plied prospectively to unknown claims and termination was applicable
equally to both the employer and employee's rights. In Webster's case,
161. Id. at 650-51.
162. Id. at 651.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 652.
165. Id.
166. 128 S.W.3d 223, 226 (Tex. 2003).
167. Id. at 225-27.
168. Id. at 228.
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however, the employer reserved the right to abolish or modify "any per-
sonnel policy" without notice.169 Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court
characterized the ADR policy as "ambiguous" because it is "not possible
to determine from the document itself whether the unilateral termination
right applies to the parties' agreement to arbitrate, or only to personnel
policies concerning the at-will employment relationship." In remanding
the case, the Supreme Court ordered the trial court to determine what
the parties intended by giving the company the unrestricted right to uni-
laterally abolish or modify any personnel policies without notice.
170
The holding in May v. Higbee Co. clarified the interlocutory appellate
review requirements in arbitration disputes. 171 In May, the plaintiff filed
suit in federal court claiming discrimination after being denied a promo-
tion. The company sought to compel arbitration on the grounds that a
post-employment policy change in June 2001, which the plaintiff admitted
receiving, created a mandatory arbitration program. The plaintiff also
admitted that she had signed an acknowledgment form. Moreover, as a
management employee, the plaintiff was responsible for distributing in-
formation about the program and obtaining signatures.'
72
The trial court refused to compel arbitration sought by the company,
finding that the plaintiff had not actually agreed to arbitrate but only ac-
knowledged receiving documents about the program. Moreover, the
court found that the acknowledgment form was ambiguous and internally
inconsistent. 73
Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16, the company timely filed its appeal and also
moved to certify the decision for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), but the trial court denied the motion.174 In holding that the
dispute was reviewable as interlocutory, the Fifth Circuit had to clarify its
2003 decision in Cuauhtemoc Moctezuma S.A. de C. V. v. Montana Bever-
age Co. That ruling, according to the plaintiff, stood for the proposition
that the absence of a binding arbitration agreement deprived the Fifth
Circuit of jurisdiction to consider an interlocutory appeal.
The Fifth Circuit clarified that "whether the parties have entered into a
binding agreement to arbitrate is one of the inquiries that we undertake
in an interlocutory appeal of the denial of a motion to compel arbitra-
tion."'1 75 The court overcame questions concerning whether the plaintiff
was bound by her acknowledgement signature by the fact that the plain-
tiff continued her employment, a condition plainly described on the ac-
knowledgement form as one manifesting consent. 176 Therefore, the Fifth
Circuit concluded, because the trial court's ruling was contrary to the fed-
169. Id. at 228-29.
170. Id.
171. 372 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2004).
172. Id. at 758-59.
173. Id. at 768.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 761-64.
176. Id. at 764.
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eral policy embodied in the Federal Arbitration Act favoring arbitration,
interlocutory appeal was appropriate. 177 Although the court acknowl-
edged that "there may well be cases in which an attempt to compel arbi-
tration is so meritless that it fails to trigger the advantages of the statute
authorizing the interlocutory appeal," the court explained that "any such
cases would be the exception, the rare exception."'1 78
Like the plaintiff in Webster, the plaintiff in In re Luna filed a lawsuit
alleging that his termination was motivated by retaliation because he had
filed a workers' compensation claim.179 Upon being hired in 1998,
Johnny Luna signed an ADR agreement requiring him to pay half the
arbitration costs capped at the amount of his gross monthly income and
prohibited punitive damages and reinstatement as remedies. Luna like-
wise signed a form in 2002 acknowledging his receipt of an employee
handbook containing a similar ADR agreement. The trial court granted
the company's motion to compel arbitration of the claim and to stay the
litigation.
On appeal, a unanimous panel ruled that the cost provision would
"place an oppressive burden on Luna," which weighed heavily toward a
finding that the arbitration agreement as a whole was so one-sided that it
was substantively unconscionable. 80 Likewise, the workers' compensa-
tion anti-retaliation statute allowed both punitive damages and reinstate-
ment as remedies. The court explained that "although preclusion of
statutory remedies may not always weigh toward a finding that the provi-
sions as a whole are substantively unconscionable, their preclusion does
so with regard to the statutory remedies at issue in this case because
Luna's claim is one brought for alleged retaliation for filing a workers'
compensation claim as part of the overall Workers' Compensation Act."
Therefore, because the company benefited from the workers' compensa-
tion law as a subscriber, it should not be permitted to enforce the arbitra-
tion agreement's limits on the legal remedies. 181
Notably, the appellate court did not find three other provisions in the
arbitration agreement to be unconscionable. 82 First, the fact that written
notice of a claim needed to be made within one year, shortening the stat-
ute of limitations for section 451 claims by one year, was not unconscion-
able because that provision applied equally to both parties and because
Luna filed his claim within one year.183 Second, the fact that the parties
imposed limitations on discovery was not unconscionable because those
limits were largely applicable to both parties, and Texas courts have per-
mitted parties to completely eliminate discovery in arbitration agree-
177. Id. at 760-63.
178. Id. at 762.
179. No. 01-03-01055-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 8241, at *3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
Sept. 9, 2004, no pet).
180. Id. at *3, *7, *16.
181. Id. at *19-21.




ments. 184 Third, the fact that all claims, even those arising in the future
and unrelated to employment, were subject to arbitration was not uncon-
scionable because both parties were equally bound.
185
The San Antonio Court of Appeals concluded, however, that
because the purpose of arbitration is to afford the parties an alterna-
tive forum in which to vindicate their claims, and because the cost
provisions and remedy limitations together deprive Luna of his op-
portunity to vindicate his claim in the arbitral forum, we hold that
those provisions are integral to the purpose of the agreement and
cannot be severed. 186
When Travis Grisby, the plaintiff in In re R & R Personnel Specialists of
Tyler Inc., sustained a lower back injury on the job, his employer, R & R
Personnel Specialists, was a nonsubscriber under the Texas Workers'
Compensation Act but maintained an Employee Injury Benefit Plan es-
tablished under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA). 187 Plan participants were required to agree to the terms of a
waiver, as well as the binding and exclusive arbitration agreement at-
tached to the plan description. Moreover, the plan document provided
that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governed the interpretation, en-
forcement, and all judicial proceedings relating to the waiver and arbitra-
tion procedures. The waiver, which Grisby signed, likewise incorporated
by reference the arbitration procedures described in the plan documents.
Grisby sought and received plan benefits for his injuries, but he subse-
quently sued to recover additional compensatory damages. When the
trial court denied R & R's motion to compel arbitration, R & R sought
mandamus.188
Section 406.033(e) of the Texas Labor Code provides that any agree-
ment by an employee to waive a right to recover damages for personal
injuries sustained by an employee in the course and scope of the employ-
ment is void and unenforceable. 189 The FAA, however, provides that a
written arbitration agreement, like the waiver in this case, is "valid, irrev-
ocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." The FAA has been described
as a "declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration."
Grisby argued that the waiver required him to waive his right to trial by
jury and further restricts the rights guaranteed to employees of nonsub-
scribers because it does not limit the defenses that can be raised by a non-
subscribing employer. Therefore, he contended that the nonwaiver provi-
sion rendered the waiver void and unenforceable. The appellate court
disagreed and concluded that "the FAA preempts the application of the
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at *35.
187. 146 S.W.3d 699, 701 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2004, no pet. h.)
188. Id. at 701-02.
189. TEX. LAB. CODE. ANN. § 406.033(e) (Vernon 2004).
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nonwaiver provision [of the Texas Labor Code] to prevent or restrict en-
forcement of the arbitration provisions." 190 Therefore, because Grisby's
state law and public policy arguments were irrelevant, "the trial court
could not have reasonably concluded that R & R failed to show it was
entitled to compel arbitration or that Grisby established a defense to
arbitration."'191
VI. TEXAS TORTS
Texas law on intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED")
claims changed significantly in 2004 with the Texas Supreme Court's issu-
ance of its long-awaited decision in Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v.
Zeltwanger.192 The case garnered substantial publicity as a result of the
eight-figure judgment against the employer. The original judgment was
based on Joan Zeltwanger's claims that she was subjected to sexual har-
assment and IIED by her supervisor.
The critical issue on appeal was whether the harassing acts of
Zeltwanger's supervisor could support the jury's finding that her em-
ployer was also liable for the common law tort of IIED as an additional
claim.193 Under both Texas law and federal law, sexual harassment vio-
lates statutes that limit a plaintiff's potential recovery. Depending upon
the size of the employer, a plaintiff may receive a maximum of $300,000
in compensatory and punitive damages. In contrast, an IIED claim has
fewer limits and permits a much larger potential recovery. As a result,
plaintiffs usually pursue both claims at the same time in an effort to get
the largest possible recovery.194
Moreover, a claim for sexual harassment lies only against the em-
ployer, not the harasser. Therefore, if IIED is the only claim asserted,
employers who are incorporated or have their principal place of business
outside of Texas can remove a case that is originally filed in Texas state
court to federal court (usually a preferable forum). However, if the har-
asser is a Texas citizen, and is sued personally for IIED, the case must
remain in Texas state court. Thus, underlying this case are two issues of
both economic and strategic importance-the damages an employee can
recover on claims of discrimination and the likelihood that a federal,
rather than state, court will decide that issue.
The employer argued that the IIED claim was not used properly and
that it should only be used as a "gap filler" tort. In other words, it is only
supposed to be used to remedy wrongs that are not specifically addressed
by other laws. This description did not fit Zeltwanger's claim because she
alleged principally that her emotional distress was the result of sexual
harassment-something that is already prohibited by both federal and
190. In re R & R Pers. Specialists of Tyler, Inc., 146 S.W.3d at 703-04.
191. Id. at 702-05.
192. 144 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. 2004).
193. Id. at 442.
194. Id. at 446.
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state statutes. In addition, the employer contended that although
Zeltwanger's evidence might establish a claim of sexual harassment, it
was legally insufficient to meet the high threshold of "outrageous" con-
duct that is required to prove an IIED claim. While both the district and
intermediate appellate courts rejected these arguments, the Texas Su-
preme Court accepted both of these arguments and reversed the court of
appeals on both alternative grounds. 195 The judgment on the IIED claim
was reversed and the claim defeated. 196
Accordingly, after Zeltwanger, employers have a new defense to IIED
claims. Although the decision should provide employers a measure of
comfort, the Zeltwanger opinion leaves a few significant questions unan-
swered. For example, it remains an open question whether other common
law torts would be judged similarly incompatible with a sexual harass-
ment claim. Thus, if Zeltwanger's harasser had touched her in an unwel-
come and offensive way, it is questionable whether the Texas Supreme
Court would permit a common law claim of battery to be added to a
sexual harassment claim based on the same facts. Further, a question
remains whether the Texas Supreme Court would have limited
Zeltwanger to statutory damages had the harassment she suffered been
more severe.
The ruling in Olander v. Compass Bank appears unremarkable: a cove-
nant not to compete contained in the defendant's stock option agree-
ments was found to be unenforceable under Texas law because the
employer failed to prove that it conveyed any confidential information to
the plaintiff, that it promised to convey such information, or that it made
any other "enforceable" promise.197 The clause, however, made the con-
tinued existence of stock option agreements dependent entirely upon the
executive remaining an employee, but the company had the discretion to
terminate the executive's employment at any time without cause. This,
the court held, was the essence of an illusory promise, and therefore, the
court could not enforce the non-compete clause.
What makes this case notable is the particular wording of the stock
option agreement requiring the plaintiff to return any profits on the stock
option agreements in the event a court declared the non-compete clause
unenforceable. Because of this wording, the court ordered the plaintiff to
return the nearly $225,000 profits from the stock option agreements.1 98
This ruling shows that an employer can achieve an effect similar to en-
forcement of a non-compete agreement if compensation or benefits are
conditioned on the validity of the non-compete agreement.
It is well-settled law in Texas that employment for an indefinite term
may be terminated at will and without cause. In 1985, the Texas Supreme
Court created a narrow exception to the termination at-will policy in Sab-
195. Id. at 445-49.
196. Id. at 450.
197. 363 F.3d 560, 564-66 (5th Cir. 2004).
198. Id. at 566-68.
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ine Pilot Services, Inc. v. Hauck-if the sole reason for the employee's
termination was his or her refusal to perform an illegal act-being "unac-
ceptably forced to chose between risking criminal liability or being
discharged."
The plaintiff in Morales v. Simuflite Training International, Inc. was re-
quired to maintain Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) training cer-
tificates in order to be employed as a flying instructor. 199 In October
1999, the plaintiff's instructor certification expired, and he asked his em-
ployer to provide him with the appropriate training to get the certifica-
tion renewed. Knowing that he had not met the renewal requirements,
the employer marked the plaintiff in the computer system as an ineligible
trainer, but somehow scheduled him to provide training he was no longer
qualified to provide. The plaintiff notified his supervisor of his lack of
certification, but the supervisor told him to allow the pilots to practice
anyway, and the supervisor subsequently signed off on the training
records without the plaintiff's knowledge.
When the FAA initiated an investigation, there was evidence sug-
gesting that the supervisor asked the plaintiff to sign a blank flight report
form, but the plaintiff refused out of a concern that the company would
falsify it in an effort to cure the FAA violation. The plaintiff and the
supervisor were terminated.
The plaintiff filed suit alleging that his termination occurred solely be-
cause he refused to sign the blank form and that signing it would have
subjected him to criminal penalty. The trial court, however, granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment because there was no genuine
issue of fact that the plaintiff was asked to perform an illegal act.200
Over the defendant's arguments that failing to sign the form would not
subject him to criminal penalty, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals rea-
soned that the plaintiff could have been charged with aiding and abetting
under federal law if he participated in a plan where it was foreseeable
that false information would be used in statements made to a government
agency in order to further the plan.201 In so holding, the court established
new precedent that being forced to perform an act that might be criminal
is sufficient for Sabine Pilot protection. 202
VII. TRADITIONAL LABOR
Under the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in NLRB v. Weingarten, union
employees are permitted to have a co-worker present at an investigatory
interview that the employee reasonably believed might result in disci-
pline. Prior to NLRB's 2000 ruling in Epilepsy Foundation, the board
followed the long-standing rule that the Weingarten right does not extend
to a workplace where the employees are not represented by a union. In
199. 132 S.W.3d 603, 605 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).





IBM Corp., NLRB decided to overrule Epilepsy Foundation and return
to earlier board precedent holding that the Weingarten right does not ex-
tend to a non-unionized workplace. 20 3
The petitioner in Hoffman v. Kramer was a Southwest Airline pilot and
part of a "cadre of reformers [who] perceived mismanagement and im-
proper administration" by the Southwest Airline Pilots Association of-
ficers, and who petitioned the union to investigate a slate of former
officers for alleged mismanagement and for breach of their fiduciary du-
ties.204 The union refused to take action and the petitioner asked the
court for authority to sue under the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act (LMRDA) alleging that the former union officials de-
stroyed records, wasted union funds, and misappropriated union funds
for personal expenses. The federal district court judge concluded that the
petitioner lacked standing to sue. Although the court concluded that the
alleged actions by the officers did not amount to a breach of fiduciary
duty under the LMRDA, the court did not explain its good cause
standard.205
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion because the
petitioner's claims failed on several grounds, but in doing so, it estab-
lished the "good cause" eligibility standards for filing suit under the
LMRDA.20 6 The Third, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuit
Courts follow standards established by the 1966 Ninth Circuit ruling in
Homer v. Ferron, while the Second Circuit adopted a "more demanding
showing" in 1976 that requires a showing of "a reasonable likelihood of
success." Under the Fifth Circuit's formulation, the petitioner must: (1)
show that the alleged misconduct directly implicates the fiduciary duties
enumerated in section 501(a) of the LMRDA; (2) must seek remedies
that would realistically benefit the union and/or membership of the
union; (3) plausibly allege facts supporting a conclusion that the breaches
were presented to the union; (4) make a showing that the union's refusal
to act was objectively unreasonable; and (5) convince the court that some
evidence exists that will support the claims of a breach under section
501(a). 20 7
VIII. BENEFITS
The issue confronting the U.S. Supreme Court in Raymond B. Yates,
M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon was whether the working
owner of a business (here, the sole shareholder and president of a profes-
sional corporation), who was the administrator and trustee of the profit
sharing plan, qualifies as a "participant" in a pension plan covered by
203. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (2004).
204. 362 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 2004).
205. Id.




ERISA.20 8 The case arose when three weeks before creditors filed an
involuntary bankruptcy petition against the owner, the owner repaid a
loan to the plan. The bankruptcy trustee sought to avoid this preferential
transfer. The Court determined that remand was necessary because the
owner could qualify as a participant in the plan covered by ERISA.2
0 9
The Supreme Court rejected the lower court's position that a working
owner may rank only as an "employer" and not also as an "employee" for
purposes of ERISA-sheltered plan participation.2 1 0 The Court found
multiple textual indications in the Act that Congress intended working
owners to qualify as plan participants.2 1 ' Therefore, the Court concluded
that if the plan covers one or more employees other than the business
owner and his or her spouse, a working owner may participate on equal
terms with other plan participants. Such a working owner, in common
with other employees, qualifies for the protections ERISA affords plan
participants and is governed by the rights and remedies ERISA
specifies. 212
The plan participant in Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz
worked and accrued retirement benefits under a multiemployer defined
benefit pension plan.21 3 When Thomas Heinz retired at age thirty-nine
and was eligible for early retirement benefits under the plan, the plan had
a provision calling for the suspension of benefits if a participant engaged
in "disqualifying employment," which was defined as any work per-
formed in a job classification covered in a collective bargaining agree-
ment in any occupation or job classification where contributions were to
be made to the fund. Heinz became a supervisor for a construction firm,
which was not disqualifying employment under the plan.
In 1998, when the definition of "disqualifying employment" was
amended to include work performed "in any capacity in the construction
industry," Heinz learned that his benefits would be suspended. He sued
under the anti-cutback rule in section 204(g) of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA). While the district court ruled for the
plan, the Seventh Circuit held that the amendment violated the anti-cut-
back rule.2 14 This ruling created a split-the Fifth Circuit ruled in 1998
that suspension of benefits is not protected by the anti-cutback rule.
The U.S. Supreme Court resolved the split in a unanimous opinion
holding that the plan amendment had the effect of eliminating or reduc-
ing early retirement benefits in violation of the anti-cutback rule because
it placed greater restrictions on the receipt of benefits. 215 A contrary
holding would go against the purpose of the anti-cutback rule in achiev-
208. 541 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2004).
209. Id. at 8.
210. Id. at 6, 9.
211. Id. at 9-16.
212. Id. at 4-5.
213. 541 U.S. 739 (2004).
214. Id. at 744-45.
215. Id. at 744-48.
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ing ERISA's object of protecting employees' justified expectations of re-
ceiving the benefit their employers promise them. 216 The Court also
observed that this ruling aligns with the IRS regulations prohibiting new
post-retirement restrictions after employee benefits have already
accrued. 217
It is also notable that a concurrence authored by Justice Breyer con-
cluded that the Court's ruling would not preclude future regulations ex-
plicitly allowing plan amendments enlarging the types of disqualifying
employment with respect to benefits attributable to previous services.
218
This concurrence, however, was joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg. Therefore, in light of the unani-
mous opinion and a minority concurrence, there is a lack of support for
the right to change the result by regulation.
IX. MISCELLANEOUS RULINGS, PENDING CASES, &
LEGISLATION WITH EMPLOYMENT LAW
PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS
With the recent notoriety surrounding the availability of whistleblower
protections afforded by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the importance of Wil-
liams v. Administrative Review Board becomes particularly evident. 219 In
Williams, six contract employees working for the United States Depart-
ment of Energy filed suit claiming to be the victims of a hostile work
environment after they complained about safety concerns arising out of
their work dismantling nuclear weapons. The plaintiffs believed that the
work performed by another team was unsafe, which angered the other
team as well as those that developed the dismantling process. Manage-
ment ultimately intervened, separated the groups and ended the program,
but the plaintiffs alleged that hostilities increased between them and low-
level managers regarding compliance with safety guidelines.
An administrative law judge reviewed the claims utilizing the Faragher!
Ellerth standard approved by the U.S. Supreme Court for sexual harass-
ment cases. The judge denied all of the plaintiffs' claims, and the Admin-
istrative Review Board (ARB) upheld the denials but disagreed with the
judge's application of the Faragher/Ellerth standard.
The Fifth Circuit held that the Faragher/Ellerth standard had been ex-
tended to racial harassment and could reasonably be applied to harass-
ment based on whistleblower status as well. 22 0 The court saw no
difference between a hostile environment arising from a supervisor's ani-
mosity toward a subordinate based on race or sex and one "created to
restrict the truth about adequate nuclear weapons dismantling proce-
dures-the purpose of both is to improperly remove an unwanted em-
216. Id. at 744.
217. Id. at 746.
218. Id. at 748.
219. 376 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2004).
220. Id. at 473-75, 477-78.
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ployee from the workplace through the use of intimidation." 2 21
Notably, however, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the ARB that the em-
ployees failed to notify their employer and that once the company knew
of the harassment, it acted promptly in order to escape vicarious
liability.222
In In re Prudential the parties were signatories to a commercial
lease.223 They mutually agreed to waive trial by jury in any future lawsuit
involving the lease, but when the tenant and its guarantors later sued for
rescission and damages, they nevertheless demanded a jury trial. The
trial court denied the motion of relator landlord (the insurance company)
to quash the demand. In this original proceeding, the landlord petitioned
for mandamus relief directing the trial court to enforce the parties' con-
tractual jury waiver.
The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the tenant's waiver of trial by
jury was knowing and voluntary as a matter of law and rejected the ten-
ant's numerous constitutional and policy arguments.224 The waiver was
crystal clear, and the tenant did not contend otherwise. While it came
toward the end of a long document, it was not printed in small type or
hidden in lengthy text. The paragraph was captioned in bold type, and
though "jury waiver" might have been clearer than "jury trial," the cap-
tion could not reasonably have diverted the tenant's attention or misled
him into thinking that the provision meant the opposite of what it clearly
said.
The tenant, whose formal education extended only to about the eighth
grade, did not read the lease but left that to his wife, whose educational
background was similar, but whose English was better. However, the
court found that both were charged with knowledge of all of the lease
provisions absent some claim that they were tricked into agreeing to
them, which was not asserted. The guaranty incorporated the jury waiver
in the lease.225
The court explained that simply because Rule 216 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure states that "no jury trial shall be had in any civil suit,
unless" a timely demand is made and jury fee paid-those conditions are
prerequisites to a jury trial, not guarantees of one. 226 Moreover, the
Texas Constitution says nothing about whether and under what condi-
tions such jury rights can be waived, and nothing in the constitutional
provisions themselves suggests that parties are powerless to waive trial by
jury under any other circumstances, before or after suit is filed. 227
Therefore, the trial court's refusal to enforce the jury waiver was a
clear abuse of discretion:
221. Id. at 478.
222. Id. at 479.
223. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 127 (Tex. 2004).
224. Id. at 129-35.
225. Id. at 127, 134-35.




[I]f parties are willing to agree to a non-jury trial, we think it prefera-
ble to enforce that agreement rather than leave them with arbitra-
tion as their only enforceable option. By agreeing to arbitration,
parties waive not only their right to trial by jury but their right to
appeal, whereas by agreeing to waive only the former right, they take
advantage of the reduced expense and delay of a bench trial, avoid
the expense of arbitration, and retain their right to appeal. The par-
ties obtain dispute resolution of their own choosing in a manner al-
ready afforded to litigants in their courts. Their rights, and the
orderly development of the law, are further protected by appeal.
And even if the option appeals only to a few, some of the tide away
from the civil justice system to alternate dispute resolution is
stemmed.228
In Fairfield Insurance Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving LP, Roy Bennett,
an employee of Stephens Martin Paving, was killed when a broom ma-
chine he was operating overturned.22 9 Fairfield Insurance Company was
Stephens's insurance carrier for both workers' compensation and em-
ployer liability coverage, and provided on-going workers' compensation
benefits to Bennett's wife. Bennett's wife, however, sued the employer,
claiming gross negligence in the death of her husband and sought only
punitive damages. After providing a defense for the company subject to
a reservation of rights, Fairfield filed the present action, seeking a declar-
atory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify its insured.
The district court denied Fairfield's summary judgment motion and held
that it had both a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify its insured
against any punitive damages award. Fairfield appealed.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question to the Texas
Supreme Court that many employers are anxiously watching: whether
Texas public policy prohibits an insurance provider from indemnifying an
award for punitive damages. 230
In 1999, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") issued an opinion let-
ter concluding that the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") reg-
ulates workplace misconduct investigations conducted by third parties
(i.e. private investigators). In so holding, the FTC imposed FCRA's on-
erous provisions onto employers.
At the end of 2003, however, President Bush signed the Fair and Accu-
rate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 ("FACT"), which amended the
FCRA by excluding misconduct investigations. As a result, employers
are no longer required: (1) to notify the accused in advance of the investi-
gation and obtain his or her consent to investigate; (2) to provide the
accused with a copy of the report; and (3) to wait a reasonable amount of
time between providing the report and taking adverse action against the
accused. It is important to note, however, that misconduct investigations
228. Id. at 132.




are still regulated, and employers should be mindful of FACT's scope lim-
itations and new obligations, particularly regarding medical information.
Banks v. Commissioner and Banaitis v. Commissioner are two cases
pending before the U.S. Supreme Court (at the time of submission of this
Survey) regarding the tax treatment of contingent attorney's fee arrange-
ments.231 The key issue is whether a plaintiff may include only the total
recovery received less the attorney fee portion in gross income (i.e. net
recovery), or whether the plaintiff must include the entire recovery in
gross income. While a deduction of attorneys' fees is allowed, the deduc-
tion is severely limited, particularly in light of the Alternative Minimum
Tax (AMT) where the attorney fee deduction is entirely disallowed.
Therefore, plaintiffs may be subject to a significantly higher tax rate.
There is currently a split among the Texas appellate courts regarding
the test used to determine whether a covenant not to compete is ancillary
to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement.232 Under one line of
cases, an ancillary agreement becomes enforceable when the employer
provides confidential information and the exchange does not have to oc-
cur at the time the employee signs the contract. The promise to give trade
secrets and the return promise not to disclose them creates an "otherwise
enforceable agreement" that meets the requirements under the Texas
Noncompete Act. A recent trend, spearheaded by the Austin Court of
Appeals, is to substitute this test with a very narrow test, requiring proof
that there was a contemporaneous or instantaneous exchange of confi-
dential information at the time of execution. This split among the courts
reinforces the uncertainty parties have regarding the enforceability of
noncompete agreements that has plagued Texas employers and employ-
ees alike for decades.
Guidance from the Texas Supreme Court, however, may be on its way.
In November 2003, the Texas Supreme Court heard oral arguments on
Alex Sheshunoff Management Services, L.P. v. Johnson, a pending case
that challenges the narrow instantly enforceable ancillary agreement test
advanced by the Austin Court of Appeals. 233 In that case, the court re-
lied on the narrow instantly enforceable ancillary agreement test to af-
firm the trial court's summary judgment, holding that the noncompete at
issue was unenforceable as a matter of law. The court held that the em-
ployer's promise was illusory for two reasons: 1) because the employer
could escape its obligation to perform by firing the employee immedi-
ately after he entered into the agreement; and 2) because the employee
already had access to special training and confidential information at the
231. Banks v. Comm'r, 345 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 541 U.S. 958 (2004);
Banaitis v. Comm'r, 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 541 U.S. 958 (2004).
232. Compare Curtis v. Ziff Energy Group, Ltd., 12 S.W.3d 114, 118 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) and Wright v. Sport Supply Group, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 289(Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.) with Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson,
124 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. granted) and CRC-Evans Pipeline Int'l, Inc.
v. Myers, 927 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.).
233. 124 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. granted).
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time the agreement was executed. 234
On appeal, the employer argued that the Sheshunoff holding conflicts
with both the Texas noncompete statute and the Texas Supreme Court's
interpretation of that statute in Light v. Centel Cellular Co.235 The em-
ployer first contended that the employee's preexisting exposure to the
confidential information at the time of the agreement did not make the
noncompete unenforceable because the employer made a binding prom-
ise of future performance. The employer was required to provide train-
ing and access to confidential information during the term of the
agreement, and a breach of that duty would excuse the employee from his
noncompete obligations. The employer further argued that continued ac-
cess to confidential information is a thing of value in and of itself, regard-
less of whether new confidential information is provided. The employee,
also relying on Light, countered that the Austin Court of Appeals was
correct in holding that the promises made by the employer to provide
training and confidential information were terminable at will, and there-
fore illusory and unenforceable.
At oral argument, the Texas Supreme Court quickly honed in on the
dilemma Texas employers face in protecting their confidential informa-
tion and trade secrets.236 One justice recognized that if you cannot con-
sider confidential information in the future or the past, there is nothing
left but what you hand the employee on the day of the contract. Another
justice questioned whether you could ever have a nonillusory promise in
a contract that is terminable at will. Although the employee argued that
a nonillusory promise would support a noncompete, when asked to iden-
tify three promises that would meet this requirement, he was hard
pressed to give even one example. The employee's only example of facts
that would meet the narrow Sheshunoff test are those facts in the Light
case. In Light, the employer promised specialized training-training that
it was obligated to provide to the employee even if it terminated the em-
ployee five minutes after the agreement.
Acknowledging that Light is the Texas Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncement on this issue, one justice noted that, "this Court is in the
position of saying people who promised [not to] go to work in the area
for a year can break that promise." Nevertheless, the court, citing the
advent of the Internet, recognized that the world has changed since Light.
This might signify that the Texas Supreme Court is ready to relax its
stance on noncompete agreements. The court pointed to its holdings en-
forcing arbitration agreements created after employment has commenced
and questioned why the same reasoning would not lead to a conclusion
that there would be sufficient consideration to support a noncompete
234. Id. at 687.
235. 883 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. 1994).
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agreement in the same context. Specifically, the court asked why the
quid pro quo for keeping the employee's high level position could not be
his agreement to sign the noncompete. The employee responded by
stressing that the question is not whether the consideration will generally
support the contract, but whether the consideration gives rise to not com-
peting. At least one justice expressed the view that continued employ-
ment in a high level position coupled with the employee's severance
rights upon termination would be sufficient motivation to agree not to
compete.
The Sheshunoff decision will be the Texas Supreme Court's first state-
ment on the enforceability of noncompetes in over a decade. The poten-
tial impact that this decision could have is evidenced by the fact that two
amicus briefs were filed in this case. 237 Perhaps the Texas Supreme Court
is ready to recognize that the Texas noncompete statute does not prohibit
an at-will ancillary agreement.238 Then again, they might be ready to
once again take on the legislative branch and renew its fight against en-
forcing noncompete agreements. Texas employers and employees can
only hope that, regardless of the outcome, the Texas Supreme Court will
provide clarity and a predictable standard that will eliminate, or at least
reduce, the current uncertainty regarding noncompete agreements.
237. Briefs were filed by the Texas Association of Business and McNeilus Truck and
Manufacturing Co.
238. See TEX. SEN. JURISPRUDENCE COMM., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 7, 73d Leg., R.S.(1993) (amendment was needed to clarify that the Act does accept ancillary agreements
that are "at-will").
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